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This first chapter considers what is potentially encompassed by the term “foreign 
relations law,” and what it might mean to think about it as a distinct field of law that can 
be compared and contrasted across national jurisdictions.  The chapter begins by 
outlining some differences between foreign relations law and international law.  It then 
describes the development of foreign relations law as a field of study within the United 
States and considers why, at least until recently, it has not been treated as a field in most 
other countries.  Finally, the chapter highlights a central question for foreign relations 
law, which is the extent to which it (or at least some parts or elements of it) should be 
treated differently than other types of domestic law—a debate referred to in the United 
States as one over “foreign affairs exceptionalism.” 
 
 
I.  FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 Before comparing and contrasting the foreign relations law of various nations, we 
first need to have a sense of what, precisely, we mean by “foreign relations law.”  For 
purposes of the book, the term is used to encompass the domestic law of each nation that 
governs how that nation interacts with the rest of the world.1  These interactions include 
most centrally those interactions that occur between nations, but they can also encompass 
interactions between a nation and the citizens or residents of other nations and with 
international institutions.  The law governing these interactions can take a variety of 
forms, including constitutional law (written and unwritten), statutory law, administrative 																																																								
* William Van Alstyne Professor, Duke Law School.  I would like to thank Gib van Ert, Shaheed 
Fatima, and Ralf Michaels for their helpful comments on this chapter.  I also benefitted from discussions 
with my students in a course on comparative foreign relations law that I taught as part of the Duke-Geneva 
Institute in Transnational Law. 
1 As noted below, the European Union, as a supranational institution that in some ways resembles 
a nation, also has a developed body of foreign relations law. 
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regulations, and judicial decisions.  Because many disputes concerning foreign relations 
law are addressed outside the courts, a full study of the topic also requires attention to 
domestic “conventions” of proper political behavior that may or may not have legal 
status. 
 
   Many issues of foreign relations law concern allocations of authority between 
political actors, such as the authority to represent the nation in diplomacy, to conclude 
and terminate international agreements, to recognize foreign governments and their 
territories, and to initiate or end the use of military force.  In federal systems, these 
allocation issues are not only horizontal but also vertical, extending to the relations 
between national and sub-national institutions.  But foreign relations law also 
encompasses issues relating to the role of the courts in transnational cases, such as 
whether certain issues are “nonjusticiable” and thus subject entirely to political branch 
determination, whether courts should take into account considerations of international 
comity when interpreting and applying domestic law, and whether and to what extent 
courts can apply international law directly to decide a particular case.  Because much of 
foreign relations law addresses how authority is allocated among governmental actors, its 
topics are most salient for constitutional democracies that separate power and have 
independent judiciaries (and such democracies are the principal focus of this book), but 
the topics also have some relevance to other forms of government.2 
 
For the purposes of this book, the term “foreign relations law” is not meant to 
encompass “pure” questions of international law—that is, a nation’s obligations under 
treaties and customary international law on the international plane.  While such 
international law governs in part how a nation conducts its foreign relations, it is both too 
vast, and in many respects too undifferentiated in its application to each nation, to be 
included in a working definition that will be useful for a study of comparative foreign 
relations law.  So, when this book refers to foreign relations law, it is referring to various 
forms of domestic law. 
 
To be sure, nations have differing international law obligations, and that fact is of 
potential comparative interest.  Perhaps most obviously, nations have differing treaty 
commitments.  These variations in commitments can exist even for customary 
international law, since it is possible that some nations will have opted out of particular 
rules through persistent objection, or that particular sets of nations are subject to 
“regional custom.”  In addition, even when international law obligations are ostensibly 
equal, nations may interpret them differently.  Given the limits on centralized 
international adjudication, these differences of interpretation will often persist.  While it 
may be fruitful to study differing national approaches to international law, and there are 
projects that attempt to do so,3 this book involves a different project. 																																																								
2 For additional discussion of some of the potential functions served by foreign relations law, see 
Campbell McLachlan, Five Conceptions of the Function of Foreign Relations Law (draft chapter for this 
volume). 
3 See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Paul B. Stephan, Pierre Hugues-Verdier, and Mila Versteeg, 
Comparative International Law: Framing the Field, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 467 (2014). 
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This book recognizes, however, that there are important interconnections between 
international law and foreign relations law.  Some international law is converted into 
domestic law, either by the courts or through legislative or executive branch directive.  
Moreover, even when international law is not incorporated into a domestic legal system, 
courts may construe domestic law in light of international legal obligations, and the 
executive branch may exercise its discretion in light of such obligations.4  At times, 
courts may even do the opposite and construe international law in light of domestic law.  
(A domestic court might presume when construing a treaty, for example, that in making 
the treaty its government would not have intended to override certain aspects of domestic 
law.)  This book’s definition of foreign relations law includes the domestic rules 
governing these interconnections, but not the substance of the underlying international 
law.5    
 
A country’s foreign relations law can also have important effects on the content 
and operation of international law.  Foreign relations law can influence how nations form 
treaties and what they agree to in treaties, and it can also affect the state practice that 
forms the foundation for rules of customary international law.  In addition, by regulating 
allocations of domestic authority, foreign relations law can affect a nation’s compliance 
with international law because different domestic institutions may have differing levels of 
commitment to (or capacity for) ensuring compliance. 
 
 As illustrations of the distinction between international law and foreign relations 
law, consider these seven examples, involving different countries and different types of 
domestic law: 
 
    In 2017, the Supreme Court of Ghana held that Ghana’s president had acted 
unconstitutionally in concluding an agreement with the United States to receive and 
resettle two detainees who had been held by the United States at the Guantanamo Bay 
naval base.6  The court reasoned that Article 75 of Ghana’s constitution required that such 
an agreement be approved by the Parliament, and the court expressly distinguished 
Ghana’s constitutional law and practice concerning treaty-making from that of the United 
States. 																																																								
4 In the United States, courts apply the “Charming Betsy” canon of construction, whereby federal 
statutes are construed, where possible, so that they do not violate international law.  See Murray v. The 
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be 
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”).  Many other 
countries have a similar canon of construction.  See ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 73-81 (2011). 
5 See also Thomas Giegerich, Foreign Relations Law (Jan. 2011), in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e937 (“The concrete form and content of a State’s foreign relations law is within its 
domestic jurisdiction and thus beyond the range of international law. . . .  Nevertheless, international law 
cannot be completely indifferent to the foreign relations law of its subjects, which, after all, forms the legal 
link connecting their internal to the international sphere.”). 




 Also in 2017, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom held that the UK 
government was required to obtain authorization from Parliament before it could initiate 
withdrawal from the European Union.7  The Court reasoned that withdrawal would result 
in “a fundamental change in the constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom,” 
and that such a change “must be affected in the only way that the UK constitution 
recognises, namely by Parliamentary legislation.”8  The Court was addressing only UK 
constitutional law, not the international law governing withdrawal from the EU, which is 
regulated by Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. 
 
 In 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada held in Canada (Prime Minister) v. 
Khadr that, although the United States was violating a Canadian citizen’s rights by 
holding him at the Guantánamo Bay detention facility, how Canada should respond to 
this violation was a matter for determination by the executive branch, not the courts.9  
The court therefore declined to order the Canadian executive branch to request the 
citizen’s repatriation to Canada.  The court based its decision on “the separation of 
powers and the well-grounded reluctance of courts to intervene in matters of foreign 
relations.”10 
 
  Also in 2010, the United Kingdom enacted a statute that, for the first time, 
gives Parliament the formal authority to block the ratification of treaties.  Although the 
UK has long had a constitutional convention—known as the “Ponsonby Rule”—whereby 
treaties will be laid before Parliament for a period of time prior to ratification, Part 2 of 
the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act of 2010 gives the House of Commons the 
authority to indefinitely block ratification.11 
 
  In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Medellín v. Texas that the U.S. 
obligation under Article 94 of the United Nations Charter to comply with decisions of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) was not “self-executing” in the U.S. legal system and 
thus that an ICJ decision could not be applied to override domestic law absent 
congressional implementation of the decision.12  The court did not question that the ICJ 
decision was binding on the United States as a matter of international law. 
 
																																																								
7 R v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5, at 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2016-0196-judgment.pdf. 
8 Id., para. 82. 
9 [2010] 1 SCR 44, at https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/7842/index.do. 
10 Id., para. 2. 11	See Arabella Lang, Parliament’s Role in Ratifying Treaties (House of Commons Library, 
Briefing Paper No. 5855, Feb. 17, 2017). 
12 552 U.S. 491, 508-09 (2008). 
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 In 2005, Germany enacted a Parliamentary Participation Act to regulate the 
use of its armed forces.13  Under the Act, the executive branch is generally required to 
obtain legislative authorization before deploying armed forces, and the Act specifies in 
detail the information that the executive must provide to the Bundestag in its requests for 
authorization.  The Act does not address the circumstances under which such 
deployments are consistent with international law governing the use of force. 
 
   Since 1973, Japan’s executive branch has followed the “Ohira Principles” in 
deciding whether to seek legislative approval of international agreements, named after the 
foreign minister who initially promulgated them.14  Under these principles, which might 
be viewed as a non-binding “constitutional convention,”15 legislative approval is to be 
sought in three general circumstances:  (1) when new legislation will be needed or 
existing legislation will have to be maintained in order to comply with the agreement, (2) 
when the agreement affects fiscal obligations, and (3) when the agreement involves 
politically important obligations.  These principles do not purport to determine whether 
an agreement is binding on Japan as a matter of international law. 
 
 In each of these examples, the relevant domestic law, whether in the form of a 
constitutional provision, statute, judicial doctrine, or customary practice, regulates how 
the nation interacts with the rest of the world, but the law does not itself purport to 
determine the nation’s international rights or duties.  Such law is what this book refers to 
as foreign relations law.  There are important commonalities and variations in this foreign 
relations law across national jurisdictions, even among developed democracies, and those 
commonalities and variations are the focus of this book.  This book also explores whether 
there are general trends in foreign relations law—for example, a growth in legislative 
involvement in foreign relations decisionmaking (such as with respect to treaty-making, 
treaty withdrawal, or the use of military force), or an increasing use of international law 
by domestic courts to constrain executive authority. 
 
 It is important to note that, even though the focus of foreign relations law is on 
domestic law rather than international law, there is nothing inherent in such a focus that 
requires valuing domestic law over international law or resisting the domestic 
incorporation of international law.  Nations vary in the extent to which their foreign 
relations law places them on the “monist” or “dualist” ends of the spectrum with respect 
to the incorporation of international law.16  Domestic doctrines that call for the direct 																																																								
13 For an English translation, see Memorandum by Dr. Katja S. Ziegler, Annex II to The Model of 
a “Parliamentary Army” Under the German Constitution, at https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ 
ld200506/ldselect/ldconst/236/5120707.htm. 
14 See Tadaatsu Mori, The Making and Application of Treaties and Other International 
Agreements (discussion paper for Duke-Japan Conference on Comparative Foreign Relations Law). 
15 Constitutional conventions are “maxims, beliefs, and principles that guide officials in how they 
exercise political discretion.”  Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in 
the United States, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1860. 
16 See generally CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM xii (2d ed. 
2015); Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Mila Versteeg, International Law in National Legal Systems: An 
Empirical Investigation, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 514 (2015). 
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incorporation of treaties or customary international law into the domestic legal system, or 
that give international law primacy over some forms of domestic law, or that look to 
international law when interpreting domestic law, are themselves part of foreign relations 
law. 
 
 There are many reasons why the content of foreign relations law might vary even 
among constitutional democracies.  Countries have differing constitutional histories.  It 
would not be surprising, for example, to find differences between constitutional 
arrangements developed after World War II and those developed earlier.  Parliamentary 
and presidential systems may have also somewhat different approaches to questions of 
the separation of powers.17  In addition, understandings of the judicial role might differ 
among countries, including as between civil law and common law countries (as well as 
those countries that have a mix of civil and common law).  The particular domestic 
politics of a country can also have an important influence on the content of its domestic 
law, including its foreign relations law.  Finally, if foreign relations law is affected by a 
nation’s geopolitical status, this will obviously vary, both among individual countries and 
over time.  Despite these points, differences in foreign relations law also sometimes 
reflect differences in policy choices, and an awareness of both the existence and potential 
ramifications of such choices can be illuminating for nations when evaluating their own 
foreign relations law. 
 
 
II.  FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW AS A “FIELD” 
 
 At least until recently, what this book is defining as foreign relations law was not 
thought of as a “field” of study outside the United States.  Instead, in most countries, it 
was thought that there were various fields of domestic law, such as constitutional law and 
administrative law, and that these fields sometimes had international components.  These 
domestic fields, in turn, were sharply distinguished from the field of international law, 
both analytically and in terms of the individuals who focused on them. 
 
 Like the character in the Molière play who discovers that he has been speaking 
prose all his life without realizing it, these nations of course have had foreign relations 
law even if they did not describe it as a field.  Most obviously, foreign relations law as 
defined by this book encompasses a lot of the law that is practiced, and has long been 
practiced, by lawyers in foreign ministries.  But unlike in the United States, most nations 
did not treat it as a discrete field of study.18 
 																																																								
17 Cf. Miriam Fendius Elman, Unpacking Democracy:  Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and 
Theories of Democratic Peace, 9 SECURITY STUDIES 91, 93 (2000) (discussing “how presidential, 
coalitional parliamentary, Westminster parliamentary, and semipresidential democratic systems . . . 
influence the autonomy of foreign policymakers, and pose different sets of constraints and opportunities for 
foreign security policy making”). 
18 Germany may be a partial exception. “Staatsrecht [Law of the State] III” encompasses that 
country’s constitutional law relating to external relations, as well as the incorporation of international law 
within the German legal system. 
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That is starting to change.  In 2014, Campbell McLachlan—one of the authors for 
this volume—published an extensive treatise on Commonwealth foreign relations law.19   
This is an important volume, and it was cited in the UK Supreme Court’s decision 
concerning Brexit.  There have also been recent books on the foreign relations law of the 
European Union, which address issues such as the process for concluding international 
agreements and the role of federalism that are somewhat comparable to the foreign 
relations law issues confronted by individual nations.20   Some non-U.S. universities are 
also starting to offer courses on foreign relations law.21 
 
The United States never actually had a monopoly on the field anyway.  One 
substantial component of foreign relations law concerns the role of domestic courts in 
applying international law and in adjudicating transnational cases that implicate 
governmental interests.  That topic has long received attention outside the United States.  
The British scholar and lawyer Cyril Picciotto published a study of the relationship 
between international law and both British law and U.S. law in 1915.22  The British 
lawyer F.A. Mann was writing about the topic as early as the 1940s, long before he 
published his 1986 volume on Foreign Affairs in English Courts.23  There also has been 
some recent focus in other countries on how federalism can affect allocations of foreign 
relations authority.24  																																																								
19 See CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (2014). 
20 MARISE CREMONA AND BRUNO DE WITTE, EU FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW:  CONSTITUTIONAL 
FUNDAMENTALS (2008); ROBERT SCHüTZE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE EU CONSTITUTION (2014); see also 
BART VAN VOOREN AND RAMSES A. WESSEL, EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW:  TEXT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS (2014). 
21 See, e.g., Foreign Affairs and the Canadian Constitution (David Dyzenhaus and Karen Knop), 
University of Toronto School of Law, at https://www.law.utoronto.ca/course/foreign-affairs-and-canadian-
constitution-0; Foreign Relations Law in Comparative Perspective (Roland Portmann), University of St. 
Gallen, at http://tools.unisg.ch/Handlers/public/CourseInformationSheet.ashx? 
Semester=FS17&EventNumber=8,492,1.00; Foreign Relations Law (Campbell McLachlan), Victoria 
University of Wellington, http://www.victoria.ac.nz/courses/laws/547/2017/offering?crn=8592; Foreign 
Relations Law (Joris Larik), University of Leiden, at 
https://studiegids.leidenuniv.nl/courses/show/63049/Foreign-Relations-Law. For courses on EU Foreign 
Relations Law, see, for example, University of Amsterdam, at 
http://studiegids.uva.nl/web/uva/sgs/en/c/9964.html; European University Institute, at 
http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/Law/ResearchAndTeaching/ 
ResearchThemes/Cremona/ConstitutionalFoundationsEUForeignRelationsLaw.asp. 
22 See CYRIL M. PICCIOTTO, THE RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 
AND OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1915).  See also H. Lauterpacht, Is International Law Part of the 
Law of England?, 25 TRANSACTIONS OF GROTIUS SOCIETY 51 (1939). 
23 See, e.g., F.A. Mann, The Sacrosanctity of the Foreign Act of State, 59 L.Q. REV. 42 (1943).  
For a more recent volume concerning international law in British courts, see SHAHEED FATIMA, USING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS (2005).  For a study of international law within the U.S. legal 
system, see BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 16.  For discussion of 
international law in Canadian courts, see GIB VAN ERT, USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CANADIAN COURTS 
(2d ed. 2008).  Some comparative studies of aspects of foreign relations law have emerged in recent years.  
See, e.g., THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT:  A COMPARATIVE STUDY (David 
Sloss ed., 2009).  
24 See, e.g., FOREIGN RELATIONS IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES (Hans Michelmann ed., 2009). 
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 It is not entirely clear why the field of foreign relations law has a much more 
extensive history in the United States than in other countries.  The United States has the 
oldest written Constitution in the world, and accommodating that Constitution to a 
radically changed international environment, as well as a substantially different U.S. role 
in that environment, may present unique challenges.  The Constitution’s inclusion of 
treaties in the Supremacy Clause, which infuses a degree of monism into U.S. 
constitutional law, may also present particular challenges for U.S. law, especially as 
treaty-making has changed over time.  In addition, the United States has a unique brand 
of federalism that tends to generate difficult legal issues as globalization has blurred the 
line between foreign and domestic affairs.  Law schools in the United States also may 
have a more flexible structure than in many other countries, allowing faculty to more 
easily cross historic subject matter divides.  Finally, many internationally-focused U.S. 
academics have experience in the Legal Adviser’s Office of the State Department, the 
work of which is often centered around foreign relations law. 
 
 Nor is it clear when to date the emergence of such a field in the United States.  
One might be tempted to date it to Louis Henkin’s magisterial treatise, Foreign Affairs 
and the Constitution, the first edition of which was published in 1972.25  Since then, U.S. 
casebooks specifically dedicated to the study of foreign relations law emerged:  initially 
the Franck and Glennon casebook, the first edition of which was published in 1987,26 and 
then the Bradley and Goldsmith casebook, the first edition of which was published in 
2002.27  There have also been a number of additional monographs on the topic.28 
 
The timing, however, is more complicated than that.  For example, some of 
Henkin’s most important foreign relations law work dates to well before his 1972 book 
and includes a number of articles from the 1950s and 1960s,29 as well as a 1958 book 
that, despite its narrower focus, was in many ways a precursor to his 1972 book.30  																																																								
25 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972). 
26 The casebook, with new authors, is currently in its Fourth Edition.  See THOMAS FRANCK, 
MICHAEL GLENNON, SEAN MURPHY, AND EDWARD SWAINE, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY LAW:  CASES, MATERIALS, AND SIMULATIONS (4th ed. 2011). 
27 The casebook is now in its Sixth Edition.  See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2017). 
28 See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER 
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1991); 
THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992); MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2007). 
29 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers:  The Niagara Reservation, 56 
COLUM. L. REV. 1151 (1956); Louis Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts:  Sabbatino, 
64 COLUM. L. REV. 805 (1964). 
30 See LOUIS HENKIN, ARMS CONTROL AND INSPECTION IN AMERICAN LAW (1958).  In the 
Introduction to this book, Henkin described it as “essentially a memorandum of law, an examination of 
problems which arms control and inspection may raise under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.”  Id. at 3.  But the study was wide-ranging and included, for example, a consideration of legal issues 
that might be entailed for the United States of joining an international criminal court.  In his 1972 book, 
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Moreover, in 1965, the American Law Institute published the Restatement (Second) of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States,31 the work on which began in the mid-
1950s.32  Restatements are non-binding but influential efforts by groups of legal experts 
that describe the state of the law in a particular field.  The first Restatement of Foreign 
Relations Law was labeled the Restatement (Second) because it was part of the second 
series of Restatements published by the American Law Institute.  A more expansive 
Restatement (Third) was published (in two volumes) in 1987, and Henkin was its Chief 
Reporter.33  In 2012, a Restatement (Fourth) project was initiated, and materials on 
treaties, jurisdiction, and immunity have now been completed; several of the Reporters 
for that project are authors in this volume.  The key point for present purposes is that 
foreign relations law has been conceived of as a field within the United States at least 
since the initial development of the Restatement (Second) in the 1950s. 
 
 But the field of foreign relations law in the United States also predates the 
Restatement projects.  As Henkin made clear in the Preface to his 1972 book, he was 
writing against the backdrop of earlier generations of work from the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, and he noted that he was “much indebted” to Quincy Wright’s 
book, The Control of American Foreign Relations, which was published in 1922.34   
 
Henkin also made several perceptive suggestions about why there had been a long 
gap in scholarly attention to U.S. foreign relations law, and some of these suggestions 
may be relevant to why foreign relations law has been less developed as a field outside 
the United States.  First, he observed that the field of constitutional law in the United 
States had become heavily focused on Supreme Court decisionmaking, and that the Court 
was not frequently engaging with foreign affairs cases during the post-World War II 
period.35  Second, he speculated that as both constitutional law and international law had 
expanded as part of the general growth of public law, they may have “developed into 
separate expertise of different experts.”36 Finally, he suggested that foreign relations law 
“fell between the constitutional lawyer and the international lawyer, perhaps nearer to the 
latter, but his credentials in constitutional law were not universally accepted and he was 
himself less than wholly comfortable with its matter and manner.”37 																																																																																																																																																																					
Henkin noted that he was drawing on his earlier writings, including the 1958 book.  See HENKIN, supra 
note 25, at x. 
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965).   
32 As the Introduction to the Restatement (Second) notes, the work on it “was made possible by a 
grant from the Ford Foundation awarded in 1955, after a preliminary study financed by the Rockefeller 
Foundation.”  Id. at vii.   For additional discussion of the genesis of the Restatement (Second), see DAVID 
L. SLOSS, THE DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY 271-80 (2016). 
33 Unlike the focus of this Handbook, the Restatement (Second) and the Restatement (Third) 
defined foreign relations law to include international law, although their coverage of the international law 
applicable to the United States was very selective. 
34 See QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922). 
35 HENKIN, supra note 25, at vii-viii. 




 During the pre-World War II period that Henkin saw as an earlier time of 
vibrancy in foreign relations law, the United States was emerging as a major world 
power.  Not coincidentally, the presidency was also becoming a more robust institution, 
including in foreign affairs.  In addition, there were efforts in this period to increase the 
scope and effectiveness of international law and institutions—through, for example, 
expansions of inter-state arbitration.  These developments generated intense discussions 
within the United States about the limits of presidential authority, the extent to which the 
government could conclude international agreements without obtaining the advice and 
consent of a supermajority of the Senate, the relevance of federalism to the government’s 
foreign affairs powers, the constitutionality of delegating U.S. “sovereignty” to 
international institutions, and the proper role of the courts in evaluating the government’s 
foreign affairs decisions and actions.38  There was particular reflection on these issues in 
the wake of World War I and the Senate’s rejection of the Versailles Treaty, and Quincy 
Wright’s book was written against the backdrop of these events.39   
 
 By the end of World War II, by contrast, the central debates in foreign relations 
law had been at least temporarily resolved.40  The debate between nationalism and 
federalism had been resolved in favor of nationalism.  The debate over executive power 
had been resolved in favor of the President.  The Senate’s role in the treaty process was 
weakened.  Courts largely deferred to the political branches.  These debates would later 
reopen, of course—first after Vietnam,41 then after end of the Cold War, and then again 
after 9/11.  Exogenous shocks in international relations, in other words, have tended 
periodically to revitalize the field of U.S. foreign relations law. 
 
 There has been an especially high level of contestation in the field of foreign 
relations law in the United States during the past several decades, with various 
“revisionist” challenges to orthodoxy.42  Some of these challenges have pressed for more 
attention to structural constitutional considerations that may limit or filter the domestic 
application of international law.  The U.S. Supreme Court during this period has been 																																																								
38 See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT’S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1917); 
LOUIS L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1933); HAROLD W. STOKE, THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS OF THE FEDERAL STATE (1931). 
39 In the Preface to his book, Wright described the genesis of his thinking that ultimately led him 
to write the book:  “In the winter of 1920, with the Treaty of Versailles still unratified and unrejected by the 
Senate,” he discussed with colleagues “a subject then in the front of everyone’s mind—the American 
system or lack of system for controlling foreign relations.”  WRIGHT, supra note 34, at ix.   
40 See generally G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign 
Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
41 Henkin’s treatise was self-consciously written “in the quicksands of Vietnam.”  HENKIN, supra 
note 25, at viii.   
42 Professor Jack Goldsmith and I authored one of the initial challenges, concerning the domestic 
status of customary international law.  See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary 
International Law as Federal Common Law:  A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 
(1997).   
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receptive to some of this revisionist thinking.43  Whatever one’s views about these 
critiques and the responses they have generated, this dialogue has helped to give vibrancy 
to the field of foreign relations law in the United States.  Scholars of U.S. foreign 
relations law today (a number of whom are authors in this volume) vary significantly in 
their ideological orientation, and the dialogue among them is generally perceived to have 
strengthened the overall quality of the work in this area. 
 
 
III.  Foreign Affairs Exceptionalism 
 
 Early in my academic career, I coined the term “foreign affairs exceptionalism.”44  
This term as I used it refers to “the view that the federal government’s foreign affairs 
powers are subject to a different, and generally more relaxed, set of constitutional 
restraints than those that govern its domestic powers.”45  This might mean, to take a few 
examples, that the federalism constraints that apply to the government’s exercise of 
domestic authority are weaker in the area of foreign affairs; that the usual separation of 
powers understandings that apply in the domestic arena (such as the proposition that the 
President is not a lawmaker) apply less strictly when foreign affairs are implicated; and 
that the judicial role is more constrained in cases implicating foreign affairs than in cases 
involving domestic affairs.  Debates over whether and to what extent there should be 
such foreign affairs exceptionalism have been a core part of scholarship relating to U.S. 
foreign relations law. 
 
 Probably no Supreme Court decision reflects this concept of exceptionalism more 
than United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation.46  This case concerned what is 
known in U.S. law as the “non-delegation doctrine.”  The idea is that Congress is not 
allowed to transfer its legislative authority to the executive branch and thus, when it 
grants authority to that branch, it must provide sufficient standards to guide the exercise 
of that authority.  The modern Supreme Court does not apply this doctrine vigorously and 
allows even very broad delegations as long as there is an “intelligible principle” in the 
legislation.47  But the Court was enforcing the doctrine more strictly during the 1930s 
when Curtiss-Wright was decided, and the Court invalidated some domestic New Deal 
legislation on that basis. 																																																								
43 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Supreme Court as a Filter Between International Law and American 
Constitutionalism, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1567 (2016). 
44 See Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089, 1104-
07 (1999); Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 529, 539 n.51, 555-56 (1999); Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural 
Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1582-86 (2003). 
45 Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, supra note 44, at 1096.  For a slightly different 
definition, see Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 
HARV. L. REV. 1899, 1900 (2015) (defining it as “the belief that legal issues arising from foreign relations 
are functionally, doctrinally, and even methodologically distinct from those arising in domestic policy”). 
46 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
47 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn’s, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). 
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At issue in Curtiss-Wright was legislation relating to the Chaco War between 
Bolivia and Paraguay.  Congress passed a statute providing that it would be a crime for 
U.S. citizens and corporations to sell arms or munitions to either of the two countries in 
the War if the President determined that a ban on such sales “may contribute to the 
reestablishment of peace between those countries.”  President Franklin Roosevelt 
immediately made such a determination, and the executive branch subsequently sought to 
prosecute the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation and its officers for selling machine guns 
to Bolivia.  The defendants argued that the statute under which they were being 
prosecuted was invalid because it delegated too much discretion to the President. 
 
The Supreme Court explained that it was “unnecessary to determine” whether the 
statute in this case would constitute an unlawful delegation of authority if it “had related 
solely to internal affairs.”48  The Court then proceeded to describe the “fundamental” 
differences between “the powers of the federal government in respect of foreign or 
external affairs and those in respect of domestic or internal affairs.”49  Among other 
things, it reasoned that, unlike its domestic powers, the federal government’s foreign 
affairs powers “did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution” and 
would in any event have “vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of 
nationality.”50   As a result, claimed the Court, “[t]he broad statement that the federal 
government can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the 
Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the 
enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs.”51 
 
 The Court in Curtiss-Wright also emphasized the “very delicate, plenary and 
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field 
of international relations.”52  It noted that the President often has access to information 
relating to foreign affairs that is not available to Congress.  As a result, reasoned the 
Court, it is often necessary for Congress to grant to the President “a degree of discretion 
and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic 
affairs alone involved.”53 
 
 The author of the Court’s opinion in Curtiss-Wright was Justice George 
Sutherland.  Sutherland had been thinking about the distinction between foreign and 
domestic affairs for many years prior to the decision.  In 1909, when serving as a senator 
from Utah, Sutherland wrote an essay entitled The Internal and External Powers of the 
																																																								
48 299 U.S. at 315. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 318. 
51 Id. at 315-16. 
52 Id. at 320. 
53 Id. 
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National Government.54  In this article, Sutherland sharply distinguished between the 
constitutional law of domestic affairs and that of foreign affairs.  About a decade later, 
Sutherland delivered a series of lectures on this topic at Columbia Law School and 
subsequently published a book based on them.55  Like his earlier article, and his later 
opinion in Curtiss-Wright, the book takes the position that “[t]he rules of construction, 
which apply when the government undertakes to deal with internal matters, may not 
apply, in the case of external matters, in the same way, or to the same degree, or, 
conceivably, in some cases, may not apply at all.”56  As one commentator observed, 
Sutherland in Curtiss-Wright was “in the happy position of being able to give [his] 
writings and speeches the status of law.”57 
 
 The analysis in Curtiss-Wright has been heavily criticized.  Commentators have 
especially resisted the idea that the foreign relations powers of the government are “extra-
constitutional,”58 and it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court today would endorse that 
proposition.  But the more general idea of foreign affairs exceptionalism—that is, the 
idea that legal issues implicating foreign affairs are to be treated differently than legal 
issues implicating domestic affairs—runs throughout much of U.S. foreign relations law.  
One way that such exceptionalism has tended to manifest itself is through heightened 
judicial deference to the executive branch in the foreign affairs area—on issues ranging 
from treaty interpretation, to foreign official immunity, to predictions about likely 
diplomatic consequences.  Part of the justification for such heightened deference is 
functional:  that the executive branch has more expertise and access to relevant 
information relating to foreign affairs than the other branches of government and that it is 
desirable for the United States to speak with “one voice” in foreign affairs where 
possible. 
 
Some commentators contend that the U.S. Supreme Court has been shifting away 
from foreign affairs exceptionalism since the end of the Cold War,59 although this claim 
has been contested.60   The Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Zivotofsky v. Kerry 
suggests that the Court is still attentive to the comparative advantages of the presidency 																																																								
54 191 N. AM. REV. 373 (1910).  The essay was first printed as a Senate document in 1909.  See S. 
Doc. No. 61-417 (1909). 
55 See GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS (1919). 
56 Id. at 29. 
57 David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power:  An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland’s 
Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 476 (1946). For additional discussion of the decision, see, for example, Charles 
A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 
1 (1973), and H. Jefferson Powell, The Story of Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, in PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER STORIES 195 (Curtis A. Bradley & Christopher H. Schroeder eds., 2009).  
58 See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 379 (2000). 
59 See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 45. 
60 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Foreign Relations Law and the Purported Shift Away from 
“Exceptionalism,” 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 294 (2015); Carlos M. Vázquez, The Abiding Exceptionalism of 
Foreign Relations Doctrine, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 305 (2015). 
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in the foreign affairs arena.61  In that case, the Court held that the President had the 
exclusive authority to determine the U.S. position with respect to the status of Jerusalem 
and that Congress had unconstitutionally interfered with that authority in attempting to 
require the State Department to designate in the passports of U.S. citizen children born in 
Jerusalem that the birthplace was “Israel.”  While discounting some of the broad dicta 
from Curtiss-Wright, the Court emphasized that the nation needs to speak with one voice 
on the issue of recognizing foreign sovereigns and their territories and that “[b]etween the 
two political branches, only the Executive has the characteristic of unity at all times.”62  
The Court also explained that “[t]he President is capable, in ways Congress is not, of 
engaging in the delicate and often secret diplomatic contacts that may lead to a decision 
on recognition” and that he “is also better positioned to take the decisive, unequivocal 
action necessary to recognize other states at international law.”63 
 
 Whatever one may think about foreign affairs exceptionalism, it should be kept in 
mind that it does not mean isolationism or resistance to international law.  Indeed, many 
Supreme Court decisions that seem exceptionalist with respect to federalism or executive 
power have made it easier for the national government to make and implement 
international commitments and engage in international relations.  For example: 
 
      In Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court held that the national 
government is not constrained by the federalism limits that apply to federal legislation 
when it enters into and implements treaties.64  The Court made clear that it did “not mean 
to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power,” but it said that “they 
must be ascertained in a different way.”65  For the migratory bird protection treaty at issue 
in that case, the Court explained that “[h]ere, a national interest of very nearly the first 
magnitude is involved,” and “[i]t can be protected only by national action in concert with 
that of another power.”66 
 
     In United States v. Belmont, the Court (with Justice Sutherland 
authoring the opinion) upheld President Roosevelt’s use of an executive agreement to 
settle claims with the Soviet Union as part of his recognition of that government, and it 
allowed such an agreement to displace otherwise applicable state law.67  Because of what 
it described as the national government’s “complete power over international affairs,” the 
Court reasoned that “all international compacts and agreements” are free from “any 
curtailment or interference on the part of the several states.”68 																																																								
61 See 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
62 Id. at 2079. 
63 Id. at 2086. 
64 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
65 Id. at 433. 
66 Id. at 435. 
67 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
68 Id. at 331. 
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     In Zschernig v. Miller, the Court held that an Oregon inheritance law was 
invalid because, by in effect disallowing inheritance of Oregon property by heirs living in 
Communist countries, it had the potential to “affect[] international relations in a 
persistent and subtle way.”69   While acknowledging that the states have traditionally 
regulated inheritance issues, the Court said that state laws in this area “must give way if 
they impair the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy.”70 
 
Of course, exceptionalism might also cut in the other direction—for example, by 
limiting the judicial role in a way that reduces enforcement of international law.  Perhaps 
that is how to view Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.71   In that case, the Court held 
that, because of the danger of disrupting the executive branch’s management of foreign 
relations, “the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within 
its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by this 
country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement 
regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking 
violates customary international law.”72  In dissent, Justice White complained that the 
Court had “with one broad stroke, declared the ascertainment and application of 
international law beyond the competence of the courts of the United States in a large and 
important category of cases.”73 
 
Some degree of exceptionalism is probably inevitable, if for no other reason than 
that the legal materials relating to foreign affairs sometimes have no precise analogue in 
domestic law.  For example, although treaties are similar in some ways to statutes in the 
U.S. legal system, they are also different in that they are made through a different 
process, and more importantly, they can create both international law and domestic U.S. 
law and thus implicate issues of reciprocity not implicated by mere domestic legislation.  
Similarly, although it is surely an overstatement to suggest that for the purposes of 
foreign affairs the states “do not exist,”74 state actions relating to foreign affairs can create 
externalities for the entire nation that need to be considered in evaluating the proper 
application of federalism doctrines.  And, while it is an overstatement to suggest that the 
President is the only important actor for the United States in foreign affairs, the President 
does possess unique access to information relating to foreign affairs and is able to act 																																																								
69 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968). 
70 Id. 
71 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
72 Id. at 428. 
73 Id. at 439 (White, J., dissenting).  The Supreme Court’s sovereign immunity decisions prior to 
the enactment of 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act may be another example of how foreign affairs 
exceptionalism will not necessarily promote compliance with or incorporation of international law.  See, 
e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 38 (1945) (“[I]t is the duty of the courts . . . not to 
enlarge an immunity [of a foreign government] to an extent which the [U.S.] government, although often 
asked, has not seen fit to recognize.”). 
74 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE US CONSTITUTION 149-50 (2d ed. 1996). 
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more quickly and in a more coordinated way in responding to foreign affairs 
developments than Congress, which faces both collective action limitations and internal 
partisan competition.   
 
These observations are certainly not intended to suggest that the legal 
understandings that apply to domestic affairs have no application to foreign affairs.  In 
many instances, these understandings very likely should apply—for example, with 
respect to the protection of individual rights within the country.  But part of the vibrancy 
of the field of foreign relations law in the United States stems from the dialogue and 
contestation over when foreign affairs genuinely merit different legal treatment.  
 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
 There is a certain amount of arbitrariness in any attempt to define a “field” of 
legal study.  When deciding whether to consider foreign relations law as a field, the 
ultimate question is whether valuable insights can be obtained by focusing on its 
particular collection of legal materials and doctrines.75  For U.S. scholars, the answer has 
long been yes, and scholars in other countries are now increasingly finding that such a 
focus can be useful.76  This book in turn asks another question: whether valuable insights 
can be obtained by comparing these bodies of foreign relations law across national 
jurisdictions, and with organizations like the European Union.  The chapters that follow 
explore that question, both generally and with respect to a variety of specific foreign 
relations law topics. 
 
As will become apparent in these chapters, common issues can be perceived when 
studying foreign relations law across multiple jurisdictions.  For example, a number of 
countries have struggled with whether and to what extent their legislatures should 
become more involved in foreign relations decisionmaking.  On the one hand, executives 
have certain advantages in foreign relations, such as a unitary voice, better access to 
relevant information, and the ability to act quickly.  On the other hand, foreign relations 
decisions sometimes entail potential risks or tradeoffs for the nation that are sufficiently 
serious that they might seem to warrant full democratic deliberation.   
 
Another common issue concerns the proper role of the courts in foreign affairs.  
Courts are likely to be sensitive to the danger that their interventions could undercut their 
government’s effectiveness in foreign relations or create unnecessary friction with other 
countries.  But they may also perceive that the political process relating to foreign affairs 																																																								
75 Cf. Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 221, 242 (2010) (“At a minimum, a legal field must exhibit two characteristics: 
commonality and distinctiveness.”); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse:  What Cyberlaw Might 
Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 502 (1999) (“By working through these examples of law interacting with 
cyberspace, we will throw into relief a set of general questions about law’s regulation outside of 
cyberspace.”). 
76 For potential tradeoffs associated with conceiving of foreign relations law as a field, see Karen 
Knop, Foreign Relations Law:  Comparison as Invention (draft chapter for this volume). 
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is not by itself sufficient to ensure vindication of fundamental principles of either 
domestic or international law. 
 
 Comparative foreign relations law overlaps with comparative constitutional law, 
although it is broader in some respects and narrower in others.  Foreign relations law 
encompasses a wide range of public law materials, not just constitutional law, but it does 
not extend to all of the issue areas that fall within the domain of constitutional law.  
Moreover, the constitutional law relating to foreign relations law tends to be less 
“judicialized” than other areas of constitutional law, and in part for that reason is often 
given much less attention than domestic affairs in studies of comparative constitutional 
law.77   
 
As others have noted, doing comparative public law may be more challenging 
than doing comparative private law, given the significant differences among countries in 
institutional structures.78  Moreover, the public law of a country may be substantially 
different in practice from what appears in its formal written law (that is true in the United 
States, for example), making it difficult for outside observers to have an accurate sense of 
it.  Despite these challenges, there is a rich literature on not only comparative 
constitutional law, but also comparative administrative law.  That literature has become 
analytically and methodologically sophisticated, and some of the concepts and 
approaches developed in that literature may be of value when focusing on comparative 
foreign relations law.79 
 
																																																								
77 Only one of the 64 chapters in the Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law 
directly concerns an issue of foreign relations law—the chapter by Yasuo Hasebe on war powers—
although some of the other chapters touch on the relationship between domestic law and international law.  
Of the 33 chapters in Comparative Constitutional Law (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011), only 
two directly focus on foreign relations law, and on only one aspect of it—national security law.  In his 1985 
Hague lectures on comparative approaches to international law, W.E. Butler noted that comparative law 
“has traditionally overlooked this realm” of comparative foreign relations law.  1 Receuil des Cours 83 
(1986). 
78 See Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó, Introduction, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1, 2 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012) (“Traditionally, 
comparison in private law has been regarded as less problematic than in public law.  Thus, where it seems 
fair to assume that there ought to be great convergence among industrialized democracies over the uses and 
functions of commercial contracts, that seems far from the case in constitutional law.”). 
79 For a description of some of the approaches to comparative constitutional law, see Vicki 
Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Law:  Methodologies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 78, at 54-74. 
